XTR is one of the most efficient public-key cryptosystems that allow us to compress the communication bandwidth of their ciphertext. The compact representation can be achieved by deploying a subgroup F q 2 of extension field F q 6 , so that the compression ratio of XTR cryptosystem is 1/3. On the other hand, Dijk et al. proposed an efficient public-key cryptosystem using a torus over F q 30 whose compression ratio is 4/15. It is an open problem to construct an efficient public-key cryptosystem whose compression ratio is smaller than 4/15. In this paper we propose a new variant of XTR cryptosystem over finite fields with characteristic three whose compression ratio is 1/6. The key observation is that there exists a trace map from F q 6 to F q in the case of characteristic three. Moreover, the cost of compression and decompression algorithm requires only about 1% overhead compared with the original XTR cryptosystem. Therefore, the proposed variant of XTR cryptosystem is one of the fastest public-key cryptosystems with the smallest compression ratio.
Introduction
In the classical Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange scheme, two system parameters are fixed: a large prime number q and a generator g of the multiplicative group of the basic prime field F q . In the basic DH scheme the two parties each send a random power of g to the other party. Assuming both parties know q and g, each party transmits about log 2 (q) bits to the other party.
In [6] , ElGamal suggested that finite extension fields can be used instead of prime fields, but no direct computational or communication advantages where implied. In [14] , Schnorr proposed a variant of the classical Diffie-Hellman scheme, in which g does not generate the whole multiplicative group of the prime field F q , but only a small subgroup of which the order contain relatively small compared to q. This considerably reduces the computational cost of the DH scheme, but has no effect on the number of bits to be exchanged.
After that, it has tried to make use of traces to represent and calculate powers of elements of a subgroup of a finite field to achieve efficient and compact subgroup representation. The LUC cryptosystem uses the trace over F q to represent elements of the order q + 1 subgroup of F * q 2 [16] . Compared to the traditional representation LUC leads to a factor 2 reduction in the representation size. The variant described in [7] uses the subgroup of order q 2 + q + 1 of F * q 3 instead, but as a result sizes are reduced by only a factor 1.5. In [2] , Brouwer et al. introduced for the first time how the use of finite extension fields and subgroups can be combined in such a way that the number of bits to be exchanged is reduced by a factor 3. More specifically, it was shown that elements of an order p subgroup of F * q 6 can be represented using 2 log 2 (q) bits if p divides q 2 − q + 1. Despite its communication efficiency, the method of it is rather troublesome and computationally not particularly efficient.
In 2000 Lenstra-Verheul introduced XTR [9] , a cryptosystem using the trace over F q 2 to represent elements of the order q 2 − q + 1 subgroup of F * q 6 , there by achieving a factor 3 size reduction. Also, the resulting calculations are appreciably faster than using the standard representation. XTR of security equivalent to 1024-bit RSA achieves speed comparable to cryptosystems based on random elliptic curves over random prime fields (ECC) of equivalent security. The corresponding XTR public keys are only about 2∼3 times as large as ECC keys in practical key sizes, assuming global system parameters -without the last requirement the sizes of XTR and ECC public keys are the same. Furthermore, parameter initialization from scratch for XTR takes a negligible amount of computing time, unlike RSA and ECC. Combined with its very easy programmability, this makes XTR an excellent public-key cryptosystem for a very wide variety of environments, ranging from smart cards to web servers.
On the other hand, Rubin-Silverberg proposed a torusbased cryptosystem CEILIDH over F q 6 whose compression rate is same as XTR [13] . Dijk-Woodruff then presented that a torus-based cryptosystem over F q n whose compression ratio is asymptotically φ(n)/n where φ is the Euler torsion function [4] . However, the cryptosystem proposed by Dijk-Woodruff is not so efficient as RSA with the key length in practical applications. In 2005 Dijk et al. further proposed a relatively efficient public-key cryptosystem using a torus over F q 30 whose compression ratio is φ(30)/30 = 4/15 [5] . It is an open problem to construct a practical public-key cryptosystem whose compression ratio is smaller than 4/15.
Contribution of This Paper
In this paper we present a greatly improved version of XTR that leads to a factor 6 reduction in the representation size compared to the traditional representation. That is to say, we achieve a factor 2 reduction compared to the original XTR. We show that if the characteristic of q is three, i.e., q = 3 2k−1 for some integer k, then we can use the trace over F q to represent elements of the order q − 3q + 1 subgroup of F * q 6 . Also, the resulting calculations such as exponentiations are as faster as that of XTR. Given T r (q 6 ,q) (g) and n, T r (q 6 ,q) (g n ) takes about 1291 multiplications in F q , which is only about 1% increase compared to the cost of computation of T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h n ) for given T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h) and n, where the size of n is 160 bits. Therefore, the proposed scheme is one of the fastest public-key cryptosystems with the smallest compression ratio (i.e., 1/6).
In Sect. 2 we describe XTR, and in Sect. 3 we introduce XTR over characteristic three, which achieves a factor 2 reduction in the representation size compared to XTR. Section 4 shows efficient calculations of XTR exponentiation over characteristic three. Applications and comparisons to the original XTR are given in Sect. 5. We then describe conclusion in Sect. 6.
XTR

Description of XTR
XTR uses a subgroup of prime order p of the order q 2 − q + 1 subgroup of F * q 6 . The latter group is referred to as the XTR supergroup denoted as G q 2 −q+1 and the order p subgroup G p is referred to as the XTR group. The XTR supergroup G q 2 −q+1 is not contained in any proper subfield of F q 6 due to the following fact. Combined with the choice of p it follows that computing discrete logarithms in G p is as hard, in general, as it is in F * q 6 [9] . Before describing XTR more detail, we introduce two definitions about optimal normal basis. 
If n is even, n replace n − 1.
Let n = 2m + 1 and m = l j=0 m j 2 j with m j ∈ {0, 1} and m l = 1. 2. for j = l − 1 down to 0 2.1.
If n is odd then return C 1 else return C 2
ONB)
If 2m + 1 is a prime and either of the following two conditions holds,
• q is a primitive root modulo 2m + 1,
• q is a quadratic residue modulo 2m + 1 and q
, β} forms an optimal normal basis of type II in F q m and called Type-II ONB. Here, β = γ + γ −1 and γ is the primitive (2m+1)-th root of unity.
XTR uses F q 2 arithmetic to achieve F q 6 security, without requiring explicit construction of F q 6 . Let q be a prime that is 2 mod 3. It follows that (X 3 − 1)/(X − 1) = X 2 + X + 1 is irreducible over F q and the zeros α and α q of it form an Type-I ONB for F q 2 over F q . In XTR elements of G p are represented by their trace over F q 2 . For h ∈ F * q 6 the trace T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h) over F q 2 is defined as the sum of the conjugates over
Let p and q be primes with p dividing q 2 − q + 1. Also let h be a generate of G p and let c = T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h). Suggested lengths to provide adequate levels of security are log 2 (q) ≈ 170 and log 2 (p) ≈ 160.
c n denotes T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h n ) ∈ F q 2 , for some q and h of order p dividing q 2 − q + 1 as above. Efficient computation of c n given q, p and c depends on the recurrence relation
for u, v ∈ Z. It simplifies for u = v to
In [9] , Lenstra and Verheul proved that computing c u+v and c 2u take four and two multiplications in F q respectively, when c u , c v , c u−v , and c u−2v are given.
XTR Exponentiation
In XTR, an algorithm for computing T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h n ) given T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h) and a scalar n ∈ Z is needed like the algorithm for computing h n in public-key cryptosystems based on discrete logarithm problem. By using two formula (1), (2) above, we define the following two functions called as XTR addition and XTR doubling respectively;
Theorem 1: ([9], Theorem 2.3.8) Let c and a positive integer n be given. Computing the sum c n of the n th powers of the roots takes 8 log 2 (n) multiplications in F q .
Thus, given the representation T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h) ∈ F q 2 of the conjugates of h, the representation T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h n ) ∈ F q 2 of the conjugates of the n th power of h can be computed at the cost of 8 log 2 (n) multiplications in F q , for any integer n.
Denote the above XTR exponentiation with input c and n outputs c n as
XTR-DH Key Agreement
XTR can be used in any cryptosystem that relies on the discrete logarithm problem. This section contains a description of an application of XTR that provides confidentiality service, for example Diffie-Hellman key agreement. Public Parameters : q, p, c = T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h) If Alice and Bob want to agree on a secret key K they do the following. 
XTR over Characteristic Three
The original XTR uses the trace over F q 2 to represent elements of the order q 2 −q+1 subgroup of F * q 6 , thereby achieving a factor 3 size reduction. This section shows that if q is 3 to the odd power then elements in G q 2 −q+1 can be represented as elements in F q using the trace over F q . It achieves a factor 6 size reduction, which is the half size reduction compared to the original XTR representation.
New XTR Group
We assume that q = 3 t for any odd integer t, say t = 2k − 1. Then, 3q = 3 k is an integer and q 2 − q + 1 is factorized as
In this section, we define a new XTR group G p = <g> which is a subgroup of G q− √ 3q+1 , namely, XTR uses a subgroup of prime order p of the order q − 3q + 1 subgroup of F * q 6 . The order p subgroup < g > generated by g is referred as the New XTR group. Since p does not divide any q s −1 for s = 1, 2, 3, the new XTR group G p generated by g cannot be embedded in the multiplicative group of any true subfield of F q 6 . Combined with the choice of p it follows that computing discrete logarithms in G p is as hard, in general, as it is in F * q 6 (cf. [9] , Section 5).
Here, A B denotes A is a subgroup of B.
From q = 3 t and t is odd it follows q is a generator of
over F q , where ω is a root of the polynomial (
For the simplicity, we denote
Lemma 1: Let x, y, z ∈ F q 2 with q = 3 t and t is odd.
i. Computing x q is for free. ii. Computing x 2 takes two multiplications in F q . iii. Computing x * z − y * z q takes four multiplications in F q .
Proof 1: Let
. It follows that q th powering in F q 2 does not require arithmetic operations and can thus be considered to be for free. From
2 is obtained from two multiplications in F q . Finally, to compute x * z − y * z q four multiplications in F q suffice, because it is easily verified that
Compression and Restoration
For some q and g of order p dividing q − 3q + 1, define d and e as the trace T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (g) over F q 2 and the trace T r (q 6 ,q) (g) over F q , respectively. We use the shorthand d n = T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (g n ) and e n = T r (q 6 ,q) (g n ), i.e., e n and d n are the sum of the conjugates over F q 2 and F q of g n respectively. Immediately, d = d 1 and e = e 1 .
Compression
From the definition of d n and e n , e n can be easily derived from d n due to the following equation
For
∈ F q because of Lemma 1-i. Note that as d n ∈ F q 2 and d n F q , x 1 x 2 , where x 1 and x 2 are in F q .
Define a compression function with input an element of F q 2 represented by two elements of F q , say (x 1 , x 2 ), outputs an element of F q .
Restoration
Contrary to the compression from d n to e n , this section explains how to get d n from e n , called it as restoration in this paper.
Lemma 2:
The roots of X 2 − e n X + e 
The third equality is derived from the series of subgroups in equation (3), that is to say,
) and g
From Lemma 2, we can find two roots d n and d q n by solving the quadratic formula, which are
Let e n = z ∈ F q and the roots of the quadratic equation be {(x 1 , x 2 ), (x 2 , x 1 )}, where x 1 , x 2 ∈ F q and x 1 x 2 . Actually, z = x 1 + x 2 . Define a restoration function with input e n , outputs {d n , d q n } ∈ F q 2 .
Restoration[e n ]= {d n , d q n }.
Remark 1:
In Sec. 3, we have explained how to compute e n from e 1 and any integer n. In some cryptographic protocols, we also need to compute e mn from e m and any integer n, where m is an integer arbitrary selected. We can compute it in the same way in XTR. To show that, it is enough to show <g> = <g m > and g m has the same order as g, because e m is T r q 6 ,q (g m ) by the definition. < g m >⊂< g >: Any element contained in < g m > is represented as (g m ) k for an integer k. It is equal to g (mk) , then it is contained in < g >. Consequently < g m >⊂< g > was shown.
< g >⊂< g m >: Any element contained in < g > is represented as g k for an integer k. Note that m 0 mod p due to the order of g is a prime p and g m 1. Then m is coprime to p. Therefore there are integers α and β such that nα + pβ = 1, which means k = (mα + pβ)k. Note that g p = 1 because p is the order of g. Therefore
g m has the same order as g: Because < g >=< g m > and the order of g is a prime p.
Efficient Method of Restoration -Finding d n and d q n from e n
As we have looked around at the previous section, we need to solve the quadratic formula described in Lemma 2 to extract d n and d q n from e n . In other words, we have to compute the square root extraction e 2 n − 4e
In a finite field F r s where r ≡ 3 (mod 4) and odd s, the best algorithm known [3] , [11] 
Square Root Extraction
Let R = e for some odd n 1 since
and it is efficiently computed by using the idea of Barreto et al. [1] . The basic idea is as follows.
They noticed that, if q = 3 2k−1 for some k:
The quantity (−R)
is efficiently computed in an analogues fashion to Itoh-Teechai-Tsujii inversion [8] , based on the Frobenius map in characteristic three. Let A ∈ F q . Then, one can compute A k−2 i=0 ( 3 2 ) i with no more than log 2 (k−1) + HW(k−1) − 1 multiplications in F q . Here, · and HW(·) denote the maximum integer less than its operand and the Hamming weight of its operand respectively. Thus, we need at most log 2 (k−1) + HW(k−1) + 1 multiplications in F q to compute (−R) (q+1)/4 in total.
Next we must find
Lemma 4:
√ −1 ∈ F q 2 is (ω + ω −1 ) − (ω 2 + ω −2 ) or −(ω + ω −1 ) + (ω 2 + ω −2 ).
Proof 4:
It is easily checked that (ω+ω
Lemma 5: For any
x = x 1 (ω + ω −1 ) + x 2 (ω 2 + ω −2 ) ∈ F q 2 , x · √ −1 is free. Proof 5: Because x 1 (ω + ω −1 ) + x 2 (ω 2 + ω −2 ) · √ −1 = −x 2 (ω + ω −1 ) + x 1 (ω 2 + ω −2 ).
Computation of d n and d q n
Thanks to the Eq. (5) and the results of the previous section, for given e n ∈ F q Table 1 shows the number of multiplications in F q required to compute equation (6) , where as customary we do not count the cost of additions and subtractions in F q .
For efficient computation of 3q-th power of e n (∈ F q ),
i.e., e √ 3q n , we should select q such that F q has optimal normal basis (ONB) over F 3 . As q = 3 2k−1 , 3q = 3 k . Thus, 3q-th power is performed by shift of coefficients when F q has ONB over F 3 . However, F q never has Type-I ONB over F 3 since 2k is not prime. Therefore, we should check whether F q has Type-II ONB over F 3 or not for given k. For 2 n + e
example, we may select k = 56, 71, 111, and 120, which satisfy that F q has Type-II ONB over F 3 .
Note that a multiplication (2e 
Compressed XTR Exponentiation
In this section it is shown how e n can be computed based on e 1 and an arbitrary integer n.
At the compression step, we can easily check
which concludes the justification of the compression step.
Denote the above XTR exponentiation over characteristic three with input e 1 and n outputs e n as XTR Exp 3 [e 1 , n] = e n .
Theorem 3:
Let e 1 and a positive integer n ∈ Z p be given. Assume that F q has Type-II ONB over F 3 . Then, computing e n takes about 8 log 2 (n) + log 2 (k−1) + HW(k−1) + 2 multiplications in F q .
Proof 6:
Immediate from Theorem 2, XTR Exponentiation algorithm ( [9] , Algorithm 2.3.7), and Lemma 1.
Application to XTR-DH
In this section we describe XTR version Diffie-Hellman key agreement over characteristic three. Public Parameters : q(= 3 2k−1 ), p, T r (q 6 ,q) (g) := e
Suppose that Alice and Bob who both have access to the XTR public key data, want to agree on a shared secret key K. This can be done using the following XTR version. based on e ab = T r (q 6 ,q) (g ab ).
Comparison to Original XTR
In this section, we compare XTR over characteristic three to the original XTR. Let XTR and XTR 3 denote the original XTR [9] and XTR over characteristic three respectively.
XTR Group
, where h ∈ F * q 6 . -p and q are prime, and q ≡ 2 (mod 3).
, where g ∈ F * q 6 .
-p is prime and q = 3 2k−1 .
Note that suggested lengths to provide adequate levels of security are log 2 (q) ≈ 170 and log 2 (p) ≈ 160.
XTR Exponentiation
XTR : For given T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h) and n ∈ Z p computing T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h n ) takes 8 log 2 (n) multiplications in F q .
-F q 2 has Type-I ONB over F q .
XTR 3 : For given T r (q 6 ,q) (g) and n ∈ Z p computing T r (q 6 ,q) (g n ) takes 8 log 2 (n)+ log 2 (k−1) + HW(k−1)+2 multiplications in F q .
-F q 2 has Type-II ONB over F q .
-F q has Type-II ONB over F 3 .
Denote by | · | the bit length of " · ". In the proposed XTR 3 , we have to select k such that F q has Type-II ONB over F 3 , and both order |p| of the subgroup and order |q 6 | of the whole group are large enough. Therefore, we cannot construct the proposed XTR 3 with arbitrary size of p unlike the original XTR. The security of 1024 bits (or 2048 bits) RSA cryptosystem corresponds to that of the discrete logarithm problem in the 160 bits (or 224 bits) subgroup, respectively [12] .
In order to estimate the efficiency of the proposed XTR 3 , we try to choose several ks in the following. k = 56 provides (|p|, |q 6 |) closest to (160, 1024), namely (|p|, |q 6 |) = (156, 1056), however this |p| is a bit smaller than 160. k = 71 is the smallest k such that |p| ≥ 160 and |q 6 | ≥ 1024. k = 111 provides (|p|, |q 6 |) closest to (224, 2048), namely (|p|, |q 6 |) = (225, 2101), and that also satisfies |p| ≥ 224 and |q 6 | ≥ 2048. k = 120 corresponds to a larger parameter (|p|, |q 6 |) = (378, 2273). Table 2 shows the cost of XTR and XTR 3 for the above ks. Note that the cost of XTR requires 8|p| multiplications in F q , because the size of scalar n is equal to |p|. On the other hand, the cost of XTR 3 additionally requires some overheads appeared in Table 1 . Here we estimate that the cost of XTR 3 increases by 1% compared with that of XTR for the above ks.
Communication Overhead
The communication overhead of XTR-DH in XTR 3 is about half of XTR-DH proposed in [9] and one six of traditional implementations of the Diffie-Hellman protocol that are based on subgroups of multiplicative groups of finite fields, and that achieves the same level of security.
Size of Public Key Parameter
In XTR, the public key data are q, p, and T r (q 6 ,q 2 ) (h). Thus, the total length is 3|q| + |p|. However, in the case of XTR 3 , the public key data are q(= 3 2k−1 ), p, and T r (q 6 ,q) (g), and the total length of it is 2|q| + |p|. Table 3 shows the sizes of public key data of XTR and XTR 3 . The size of public key data of XTR 3 is reduced by about 26% compared with XTR 3 for these ks.
Conclusion
In this paper we presented a new variant of XTR cryptosystem with a compact representation of the ciphertext. The compression ratio of the ciphertext becomes 1/6, which is the smallest among the previously known practical publickey cryptosystems. The computational overhead of the proposed scheme over the original XTR is only about 1%. Therefore, the proposed scheme is one of the fastest publickey cryptosystems with the smallest compression ratio.
It is a further research topic to construct a practical public-key cryptosystem that achieves the compression ratio smaller than 1/6.
